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Abstract 
A correlational study investigated the nature of excuses, including the relationship 
of excuse complexity, uniqueness, frequency, and success to the level of knowledge the 
recipient has about the excuse giver. Analysis of results from responses of 121 participants 
to questionnaires describing excuses to employers, teachers, parents, and 
spouselboy/girlfriends found that the complexity and uniqueness of excuses vary positively 
with the knowledge level of the recipient, but only when an unequal power relationship 
exists between the recipient and the excuse giver. Excuses to recipients with a low 
personal knowledge level of the excuse giver, such as employers or teachers, tended to be 
simple in nature, contained a minimum amount of information, and were usually common 
and frequently occurring. In contrast, excuses to recipients with a high personal 
knowledge ofthe excuse giver, such as parents who lived with the participants, tended to 
be complex in nature, contained significantly larger amounts of information, were 
generally more specific to the excuse giver and less frequently occurring. Old excuses 
were used more than new excuses in all contexts. Previously used excuses were also more 
frequent in low or neutral confidence conditions, and were more likely to be successful. 
Excuses were more successful to employers or teachers than to parents or spouselboy 
girlfriends. Different categories emerged for different recipients of the excuses: the illness 
category was used most in the work context, and the miscellaneous category was used 
most in the parent and spouselboy/girlfriend contexts. The influence of external control, 
and short and long term intimacy factors on the nature of excuses was discussed. 
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Deception in Interpersonal Settings: The Relationship between the Content 
of an Excuse and Its Recipient 
Excuse making, when used as an untrue tactical communication, has been 
described as a special form of deception (Weiner, 1995). A less pejorative viewpoint 
suggests excuse making is "a way of living with our human flaws" (Snyder, Higgins & 
Stucky, 1983, p.1). The behavior may also be considered either chronic or acute. It is 
described in such ancient religious manuscripts of human morality and behavior as The 
Bible and early church writings of Sainte Augustine. Further, inasmuch as excuses (as lies) 
have widespread everyday use (e.g., Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984), the phenomenon 
presupposes both a purposeful goal and a continuing successful human interactive 
behavior. According to Camden et al., the ethics of "social" white lies have remained 
largely unconsidered, but their frequency gives credence to the argument that they are 
common, justifiable, and often the preferred communication strategy as the most efficient 
solution to interpersonal communication problems (Knapp & Comadena, 1979). 
Excuses and self-deceptions have been associated with a variety of performance 
task advantage outcomes and improved physiological measures and psychological health 
(Snyder & Higgins, 1988). The large body of work ofC.R. Snyder on deception 
emphasizes the importance of attributional styles in excuse making, and identifies the 
external, variable, unstable, and specific rather than global pattern of attribution to be the 
prototypical excuse making pattern. He defines excuses for deception as "the motivated 
process of shifting causal attributions for negative personal outcomes from sources that 
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are relatively more central to the person's sense of self to sources that are relatively less 
central, thereby resulting in perceived benefits to the person's image and sense of control" 
(Snyder & Higgins, 1988, p.23). Snyder suggests the excuse giver (deceiver) undergoes 
subjective analysis of one or more attributional strategies for distancing himlherself from a 
negative outcome. In this paper I will attempt to identify the variables related to 
deception in explaining the strategies of the excuse giver, as well as investigate possible 
relationships associated with the choice (content) and the recipient (context) of the 
excuses. 
Detection of Deception in Interpersonal Settings 
A common theme found in past and more recent reviews of the extensive literature 
covering verbal deception concerns how many of the experimental strategies and 
procedures have been used for impersonal rather than interpersonal relationships (Knapp 
& Comadena, 1979; Kraut, 1980; Miller, Mongeau, & Sleight, 1986; Zucherman, 
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). In addition, approaches in experimental studies often focus 
on variables (such as verbal and physical) associated with the deceiver rather than with the 
receiver/recipient (DePaulo, Zuckerman, & Rosenthal, 1980; Knapp & Comadena, 1979). 
The roles of the deceiver and that of the recipient of the deception are customarily treated 
separately in the experimental setting, with the actors mostly unknown to each other 
(Burgoon, Buller, Floyd & Grandpre, 1996; Brandt, Miller & Hocking, 1980; Miller et al., 
1986), and having little concern for results of the deceptive behavior (Miller et al. 1986; 
Stiff & Miller, 1986). In this way, consideration of the dynamic relationship between 
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participants and the complexity of human interaction and motivation is neglected (Knapp 
& Comadena, 1979; McCornack & Parks, 1986). Additionally, empirical studies are likely 
to be confounded by demand characteristics and lack of mundane realism (Knapp & 
Comadena, 1979; Stiff & Miller, 1996). As Burgoon et al. (1996, p.726) note, 
"deception is not a one-way activity, and both sender and receiver actively participate in 
constructing the deceptive communication." 
In a review of representativeness of language and cognition, Miller posited that 
effective communication of information requires sufficient knowledge of the recipient by 
the speaker, while the recipient "must attribute certain intentions to the source" (Miller, 
1990, p.12); i.e., the recipient assumes the message to be truthful and there is no 
intention to deceive on the part of the sender. It would appear that successful verbal 
deceptions (lies), a special form of communication, would also follow this maxim, but 
where attnbutions of intentions to the source are inaccurate (i.e., the recipient has no 
knowledge of the true intentions of the source). The following sections will attempt to 
integrate findings identifying variables associated with deception, particularly as they relate 
to relationships (familiarity) between participants. 
How Easv Is It to Detect Deception in Others? 
Experiments continue to converge on results that show that detection of deception 
(i .. e., accurate attribution of source intention) in naive observers is only a little better than 
chance (e.g., Burgoon et al., 1996; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Stiff & Miller, 1986). A 
metaanalysis of results of seven experimental studies measuring verbal behavior directly 
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showed that judgment of deceptive verbal communication was not a reliable cue for 
deception detection (Q> .20) (Kraut, 1980). These results are in contrast to the 
metaanalysis of DePaulo, Zucherman, and Rosenthal (1980), in which they report that 12 
of 14 studies showed judges' accuracy to be significantly better than chance. A more 
recent demonstration using a classroom rather than an experimental laboratory setting 
supported Kraut's finding (Desforges & Lee, 1995). Students were fairly poor at 
correctly identifYing when classmates were telling the truth or lying, when perceived 
physical deception cues (such as eye contact, posture shifts) or natural poses were 
randomly assigned to the truthful or lying video sessions of their classmates. In effect, the 
students had concentrated on the wrong aspects of the communication. Another student 
study, however, suggested that people were suspicious of the truthfulness of casual 
conversation recalled over several previous days' encounters (Schul, Burnstein, & Bardi, 
1996). In none of these studies was the relationship of the speaker to the recipient (mostly 
strangers) taken into account. Strangers were also used as senders and recipients in an 
experiment by Stiff and Miller (1986), but an interaction relationship was manipulated 
between them by exposing senders to positive or negative interrogative probes on the part 
of recipients. Perceived nonverbal cues for detection of deception, such as blinks, smiles, 
and posture shifts, were again unrelated to actual deception. 
Elaborating on their work on interactive deception studies, Burgoon et al. (1996) 
explain the poor prediction in naive observers in terms oftheir interpersonal deception 
theory. The fundamental assumption is that both sender and receiver participate in the 
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deceptive interaction, and that their goals, motives, and perceptions of their own and each 
others' behavior is discrepant. The demands of interaction increase the cognitive load for 
receivers, leading them to selectively make heuristic judgments to confirm initial 
impressions, often resulting in misleading perceptions. 
Improvement of accuracy of detection has been found in studies manipulating 
familiarity with the target's truthful behavior. Brandt, Miller, and Hocking (1982) found a 
positive effect for familiarity in observers shown a videotape ofthe target's truthful 
behavior compared to observers who had not seen the videotape. But in a similar design 
(Brandt, Miller & Hocking, 1980), the authors found increased accuracy injudgment 
across three conditions increasing in familiarity exposures, but a decrease to baseline 
accuracy (comparable to the accuracy of observers who had not seen the truthful behavior 
videotape) following the highest familiarity condition. The results suggest that, beyond a 
certain point of exposure to the target's truthful behavior, the observer's accuracy in 
detection decreases. 
Studies that have used participants with extant relationships to the target/sender 
have shown an increase in deception detection accuracy with degree of relationship. In a 
correlational study, Comadena (1982) showed spouses to be more accurate than friends in 
detection, and female spouses to be significantly more accurate than male spouses. 
However, McCornack and Parks (1986) found that the greater the level of relational 
development, the greater was the increase in truth bias (the belief that partners are telling 
the truth). In turn, as the truth bias increased, the level of detection of deception accuracy 
Deception in Interpersonal Settings 6 
decreased. The deception studies appear to suggest that familiarity of the deceiver by the 
recipient, especially that produced by relationships, is a significant variable in detection 
accuracy, and that a nonlinear relationship may exist between relationship (familiarity) and 
detection of deception accuracy. 
Suspicion States 
Although DePaulo et al. (1980) showed that a state of suspicion on the part of the 
recipient facilitated detection of deception, other studies examining the effects of 
suspicion states on detection have had inconsistent results with unrelated partners (Toris 
& DePaulo, 1984), and with related partners (Stiff: Kim & Ramesh, 1989, as cited in 
McCornak & Levine, 1990). McCornak and Levine (1990) investigated the relationship 
between levels of state induced and trait suspiciousness with accuracy in detection of 
deception as the independent variables, and found improved probabilities of deception 
detection. Building on their previous research that truth bias exists between those in 
close relationships such as the participants in their study, and that sufficiently aroused 
state suspicion will cause truth bias to be abandoned, the authors hypothesized that 
moderately high levels of suspicion should increase deception detection. Very high 
levels of state suspicion were hypothesized to develop lie bias and to decrease accuracy 
of deception, while low levels of suspicion would not destroy truth bias and would 
again result in a decrease in accuracy of deception. The factorial design of their study 
included two levels of trait suspiciousness, identified by dichotomizing scores on a self 
report measure of a generalized communicative suspicions scale, and three levels of state 
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suspicion, obtained through different information given to participants in each of the 
experimental conditions. The results of their study were as they predicted and indicated a 
curvilinear relationship between suspicion states and detection accuracy. 
Information Availability 
Bauchner, Brandt, and Miller's (1977) study investigated whether increases in 
available sensory information (verbal and nonverbal) from the sender increased detection 
accuracy of the recipient. Observers in the highest information condition had the highest 
accuracy rate of deception detection, but results did not achieve probabilities significantly 
different from chance. However, investigation of effects of information restriction 
between related and unrelated partners has been successful in establishing an interaction 
between familiarity and information levels for deception detection (Millar & Millar, 1995). 
The authors based their reasoning on the selective processing hypothesis, which suggests 
that as familiar persons are associated with greater amounts of information than strangers, 
detecting a familiar person's deception may cause the recipient to selectively or 
heuristically resort to simple decision rules (e.g., representativeness) when confronted by 
complex information instead of considering relevant information (Kahnenmen & Tversky, 
1994). In two separate experiments, Millar and Millar (1995) manipulated the amount of 
information to recipients from truthful or untruthful, and familiar or unfamiliar senders. 
The recipients experienced a restriction in audio information in one half of the trials in the 
first experiment, and a restriction in video information in one half of the trials in the 
second experiment. Results significantly confirmed the authors' hypothesis: with more 
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information, recipients were more accurate in detecting deception in strangers; with less 
information, recipients were more accurate in detecting deception in familiar people. 
Integrative Encoding 
The work of Schul and collaborators on theoretical cognitive strategies involving 
integrative encoding and suspicion states helps to explain the results of research 
identifying a nonlinear relationship between familiarity and detection, and the 
interaction between levels of information and familiarity of the Millar and Millar studies 
(Schul, 1993; Schul, Burnstein, & Bardi, 1996). The collective results of Schul et al. 
contribute to the theory of the variability of deception accuracy with elaboration of 
encoding for suspicious and unsuspicious recipients. Schul posits that the cognitive 
activity for suspicious recipients may differ from recipients who are not suspicious, 
because they engage in more elaborate encoding to prepare to cope with invalid (Le., 
deceitful) information. Schul's findings demonstrated that although (a) suspicious 
recipients could prepare to encode (and discard) invalid information more successfully 
than unsuspicious recipients, (b) some recipients would have greater difficulty discounting 
invalid information to the degree that it has been integrated with valid reports, in which 
case integrative encoding may impair deception detection. Situation (a) would be 
represented by the case of the suspicious stranger in the Millar and Millar study who has a 
single representation or schemata of the sender, and situation (b) would be represented by 
the case ofthe suspicious relative who would have muhiple schemata ofthe sender 
because of an already existing rich base of information (i.e., valid reports). 
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Summarizing the evidence from the cited studies thus far, it can be reasoned that 
successful verbal deceptions would need to include absence of knowledge of intentions of 
the sender on the part of the recipient. Nonsuspicious states would infer absence of 
counter-scenarios and elaborative encoding, and validate reliability of the source 
information from sender; thus, communication of deception would be accepted. Apart 
from disguising true intentions, the sender would need to ensure control of the amount of 
information, the degree of which would be different depending on the sender's knowledge 
of the recipient. This has been shown to be correlated to the relationship of the recipient 
to the sender. Thus, a successful lie to a stranger would involve minimal information. A 
successful lie to a recipient familiar to the sender would need a more elaborate message. 
As informative as it is, the mechanics of deception--how it works and under what 
conditions--does not address the "why" of deception. Neither can it directly examine 
underlying motivations and goals, which would seem a central focus of understanding the 
excuses-as-lies phenomenon. Instead, the mechanics of detection as identified here may be 
considered a useful tool in the further investigation of the social implications of deception 
of excuses. 
Social Implications of Deception of Excuses in Interpersonal Settings 
The focus of research on the social implications of deception rather than detection 
of excuses has varied widely . The scope of investigations has included the reasons for 
lying (Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975), the effects oflying (Hample, 1980), the goals 
and motivations underlying the deceptions (Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984; Weiner, 
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Figueroa-Munoz, & Kakiharo, 1991), relation of the attribution theory to excuses 
(Weiner, 1995), lies and impression management (Hample, 1980; Stiff & Miller, 1986), 
the content of the lies (what they are about), and their context (the situation and recipients 
of the excuse) (Lippard, 1988; Weiner et al., 1991). 
The analysis of social motivations for excuses as lies, which concerns the nature 
and the function ofthe deceptions, had a beginning in the studies of Turner et al. (1975), 
who analyzed student subjects' statements made in natural conversation. A total of 61 % of 
statements were rated dishonest by the subjects themselves. They identified five 
motivations for lying, in order of prevalence: to save face (55%), to avoid tension or 
conflict (22%), to guide social interactions (9%), to affect interpersonal relationships 
(9%), and to achieve interpersonal power (3%). The authors concluded that nonintimate 
relationships involved more distortions of truth than primary relationships, and that lies 
were common and socially acceptable. 
Hample (1980) replicated the Turner et al. findings that lies were common. In a 
correlational study examining undergraduate descriptions of lies from 13 interviews and 39 
questionnaires, Hample identified motivations as benefiting self, benefiting others, or 
benefiting a relationship. The author concluded lies are motivated by a need for social or 
economical defense in a disadvantaged situation, are often used to cope with difficulties in 
unequal power relationships, and were also often considered the only communication 
alternatives in a situation Three quarters of the subjects described situations that were 
near replications of previous ones in which lies had been used, and reported twice as many 
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lies to superiors as peers. Hample analyzed most lies to be automatic and repeated, and 
responsive rather than initiating. 
Camden, Motley and Wilson (1984) expanded the categories of the studies of 
Hample and Turner et al. in refining the development ofa social lie (content) category and 
a social motivation category. The authors noted 75% of lies benefited the liar, but 
suggested the possibility of mixed or more than one motive for a lie, such that at some 
level the liar is the eventual beneficiary (e.g., benefiting self esteem of the other improves 
how the other perceives the liar, and is really protecting the relationship). The authors 
found a greater reliance by women on the use of white lies to satisfy affiliation needs, and 
that women were more likely than men to use lies to protect self esteem. 
Building on the findings of Camden et al. (1984), Lippard (1988) focussed on the 
refinement of their major reward category system of basic needs, affiliation, and self 
esteem. Her objectives were to expand the identification of the recipient role and to 
examine the relationship between motivation and recipient categories. In a three-week 
period, 74 undergraduate students recorded all instances of deception, including a 
description of the situation of deception, the recipient's age, gender, and relationship and 
degree of intimacy to the subject, the perceived consequences for the excuse, including 
whether believed or not, and the imagined consequence for revealing the truth. She 
reported 85% of recipients of deception in her study were in relationship or affiliation 
areas (friends, acquaintances, roommates, parents, spouse, sibling, child, stranger) 
and 15% in achievement areas of school or work (employer or teacher). Lippard agreed 
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with Hample that the individuals deceived most frequently were parents and powerful 
others (teachers/employers). The author identified power and gender as variables 
affecting lying behavior, and hypothesized that a different pattern of deception might 
emerge for middle age subjects, rather than the very young adults of the study who might 
be seen as still seeking identity. 
The work of Snyder (1987) similarly suggests that the self monitoring trait may 
emerge as a significant variable for excuse studies. In describing self monitoring as a 
unique psychological construct, Snyder identified different traits and behaviors in people 
categorized as high or low self monitors. High self monitors are defined as those 
"particularly sensitive to situational appropriateness of ... social behavior and who use 
these cues as guidelines for regulating and controlling expressive behavior" (p.14), which 
is ''not necessarily congruent with private attitudes and feelings" (p.IS). On the other 
hand, low self monitors are "less attentive to social conformation about 
situational-appropriate expressed behavior" and do not ''possess a highly developed 
repertoire of self-presentational skills" (p.1S). He reports evidence that high self monitors 
"exploit their self presentational skills to successfully deceive others in a variety of 
interpersonal contexts," and they possess an ability to "look someone in the eye and tell a 
lie with a straight face" (p.22). Such traits suggest high self monitors as compared to low 
self monitors may have a larger repertoire of more complex excuses from their more 
numerous self-presentation skills within a greater variety of situations. 
The work of Weiner and collaborators (Weiner, 1995; Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, 
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& Verette, 1989; Weiner, Figueroa-Munoz, & Kakiharo, 1991) also categorized excuses 
as made in either affiliation (65%) or achievement (work or school) settings. They 
classified nine content categories of the excuses (those involving parents, friends, illness, 
other commitment, transportation, work/study, forget/negligence, intent, and 
miscellaneous). The results show virtually all withheld (true) causes were internal and 
controllable, and that excuses (lies) were almost all external, uncontrollable, and mostly 
unstable. The authors concluded that the function of excuses was to decrease inferences 
of personal responsibility, which they considered the necessary condition for excuse goals 
to be met. 
A more basic requirement for excuse goals to be met, however, might be the 
question, "Can they be believed?" This consideration keeps in mind the essential nature of 
excuses that they are untrue statements. The previously examined studies on the 
mechanics of deception suggest that the success of an excuse (whether it is believed) 
depends on both the amount of information contained in the lie and the knowledge the 
recipient of the excuse has about the excuse giver. Using this information, my focus in 
this present study will be to test (a) the relationship between the complexity of an excuse 
and the knowledge level associated with different recipients or contexts; to test the 
relationship of the nature of an excuse to the recipient depending on (b) the degree of 
uniqueness (specificity plus temporal probability) of an excuse or (c) whether it has been 
used previously or formulated especially for the occasion; and (d) whether the choice of an 
excuse is dependent upon the perception of how well the excuse will succeed, i.e., if data 
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support confidence factors for a clear choice (or clear rejection of choice) of an excuse 
content within a particular recipient context. 
It is hypothesized that there is a relationship between context (recipient area) and 
content (situation, place, thing) of the excuse, in that specific categories of excuses would 
be used depending upon the recipients of those excuses. The reasoning follows results of 
the deception detection studies, such that for success, the deceiver has to manipulate the 
content ofhislher excuse to match the optimum situation for deception for that recipient. 
Conclusions of the deception studies showed that for an unfamiliar recipient, the 
information content would need to be minimal; for a recipient with a close relationship to 
the deceiver, the information content would need to remain high. Thus, the amount of 
information in excuses would appear to depend on the familiarity of the excuse giver to 
the recipient. 
Hypothesis 1: The complexitv of an excuse is positively related to the level of 
knowledge the recipient of the excuse already possesses about the excuse giver. 
It is further hypothesized that high self monitors would offer more complex and 
varied excuses. The reasoning follows from Snyder's findings on self monitoring traits that 
high self monitors as compared to low self monitors may draw on a greater variety of 
experiences resulting from their more numerous self-presentation skills. They would thus 
tend to produce a more complex excuse for most situations. 
Hypothesis la. The complexity ofan excuse is positively related to self monitoring 
scores. 
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Second, it is hypothesized that the uniqueness of an excuse, a measure defined as 
comprising the specificity (i.e., the degree to which the excuse appears to be specially 
chosen for that particular situation rather than a global, general excuse) and temporal 
probability (the likelihood of occurrence over time) of an excuse would also be positively 
related to the level of knowledge the receiver has about the excuse giver. The reasoning 
follows from the likelihood that an excuse that is uncontrollable, global, and relatively 
frequently occurring would apply to a majority of people, and would be accepted in a 
variety of situations within the achievement (schooVwork) context, where the level of 
knowledge of the excuse maker to the recipient is low. For example, the excuse "I was 
sick." or "My car wouldn't start," might be used successfully to cut a class, excuse or 
delay examination attendance for school situations, and explain job tardiness or 
absenteeism in the employment area. The excuses may be successful because they are 
real, common, uncontrollable events true to many people some of the time, and because 
the amount of knowledge about the excuse maker is insufficient for the recipient to 
otherwise know the truth of the situation. On the other hand, such reasoning would 
seldom be likely to be successful in the spouse/boy/girlfriend relationship context, where 
the level of knowledge of the excuse giver by the recipient is high. Such knowledge 
would include an immediate assessment of the truth of such common claims such as "I 
was sick" or ''The car wouldn't start" by the excuse giver. Rather, an excuse to a 
relationship partner would be more likely to be carefully tailor made by the excuse giver 
and specific to the situation, taking into account all the relevant knowledge the recipient is 
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likely to have. Thus, the degree of uniqueness of an excuse will depend on who the 
recipient is; the more knowledge the recipient has, the more unique the excuse will be. 
Hypothesis 2. The uniqueness of an excuse. the degree to which it is attnbuted to 
be common and global or specific to that circumstance. is positively related to the level of 
knowledge the recipient of the excuse has about the excuse giver. 
Third, following the previous three hypotheses, it is further hypothesized that the 
likelihood of a previously used excuse being used again in a similar situation depends on 
who the recipient of the excuse is. The rational follows reasoning of the previous 
hypotheses in that excuses to those in the achievement area (low knowledge level) would 
be likely to be simple (Hypothesis 1), global, common and frequently occurring 
(Hypothesis 2), as such would be likely to be used successfully again. The recipient may 
accept them repeatedly, because the purported events (excuses) do re-occur (e.g., people 
can get sick more than once, and cars could break down any time). Suspicion states are 
not likely to be aroused, and detection of deception is less likely. 
In contrast, excuses in relationship contexts, particularly close relationships which 
contain the highest level of recipient knowledge of the excuse giver, are likely to be more 
complex (Hypothesis 1), with a relatively higher degree of uniqueness (Hypothesis 2), and 
as such are unlikely to be used again. It is suggested that the recipient would be likely to 
recall such complex, unique circumstances and be suspicious of the coincidence of a 
reoccurrence. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3. The frequency of an excuse is negatively related to the knowledge 
Deception in Interpersonal Settings 17 
level of the recipient. 
Last, it is hypothesized that the frequency of an excuse depends on the excuse 
maker's perception of the relative efficacy of the excuse, i.e., its power to deceive. 
Assuming confidence in the excuse to be synonymous with perceived deception, it follows 
that an important criterion of choice by excuse makers would concern their perception of 
the probability of the recipient in discovering the truth, i.e., whether old or new excuses 
are used depends on the excuse giver's confidence of the efficacy ofthe excuse for a 
particular situation. In low confidence situations, there would be more reliance on old 
excuses. In high confidence situations, there will be less reliance on old excuses. In other 
words, confidence increases risk taking (of new excuses), while lack of confidence 
decreases risk taking. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4. The frequency of an excuse is negatively related to its perceived 
power of deception. 
Method 
Subjects 
A total of 121 people participated in the study. Ninety students, 77 female and 13 
male, were volunteers from four undergraduate psychology classes and one graduate 
social science statistics class in a small Florida state university. The undergraduate 
students received extra credit for taking part in the study. Thirty-one subjects, 18 female 
and 13 male, were recruited from the local community from two twelve-step program 
groups and by word-of-mouth. The community participants and graduate students were 
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volunteers who were not compensated for their participation 
Procedure 
The psychology undergraduate subjects were introduced to the experimenter in the 
laboratory, where the purpose of the study was explained as investigating changes in 
communication strategies within important relationship contexts such as school or work, 
parents, and spouse/boy/girlfriends. Consent forms (see Appendix A) were distributed, 
and were read and completed by the students. The three-page questionnaire and an 
18-itemhighllow monitoring scale (see Appendix D) were distributed (Snyder, 1979), 
together with a simple demographics information form (for age, sex, student and work 
status) (see Appendix C). Before the students completed the questionnaires, the 
experimenter again informed the students that the study was voluntary, and no penalty 
would be imposed for nonparticipation The questionnaires were reviewed by the 
experimenter, and a question and answer period time was allowed for participants to ask 
for any clarification. 
The community participants and students from the graduate statistics class were 
given the same questionnaires, with a modified covering letter (see Appendix B) with the 
same explanation of the purpose of the study as given to the undergraduate subjects but 
without consent forms enclosed. They were asked to return the completed questionnaires 
and forms in the stamped, return address envelope provided and thanked for their 
voluntary participation. Anonymity of participants was assured by responses identified 
only by a four-digit code. 
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Participants read the following instructions (cf Lippard, 1988; Weiner et aI. 1991): 
Please think of an occasion concerning your SPOUSE, or a GIRLFRIEND or BOYFRIEND, in which you 
gave an excuse that was not the truth. That is, you did something you should not have, or failed to do 
something you should have, and you then withheld the real reason for your behavior and gave a different 
one. Please describe the circumstances, what you actually said, and the reasons you chose that excuse. 
The situation was: 
The excuse I gave was: 
The reason I chose that particular excuse was (CHECK ALL ITEMS THAT APPLY TO YOUR 
EXCUSE) 
___ (a). I have used this excuse before in somewhat similar circumstances . 
. ___ {b) It was the kind of excuse that would be accepted easily. 
___ (c). It would be very unlikely or impossible for my spouse/boy/girlfriend to find out what really 
happened. 
___ (d). It was the only suitable excuse I could have used in the circumstances. 
___ ( e) I have not used this excuse before. 
___ (t)o (other, please specify): 
As a result of my giving the excuse, 
If you had told the real reason for your action/nonaction, what do you imagine might have been the 
consequences? 
The same wording was repeated on the other two pages ofthe questionnaire, where the 
words "Parents or Guardians" or "Work or School" were substituted for the recipients 
(Spouse, or Boyfriend or Girlfriend) given above. The order ofthe pages ofthe 
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three-page questionnaire was counter balanced to control for order effects. 
The three-page questionnaire was coded as follows: 
Excuse content. The excuse content was coded according to whether the excuse 
principally used statements concerning the following six categories (cf. Weiner et al., 
1991). 
1. parent/relative/friend/other 
2. illness 
3. other commitment/work/study 
4. transportation 
5. forget/negligence/no time 
6. miscellaneous 
Criterion 
Hypothesis 1. The criterion variable for Hypothesis I was defined as the total 
complexity of the excuse, operationalized by the number of separate pieces of information 
contained in the verbal statement comprising the excuse. The complexity was coded as a 
continuous variable, with one point recorded for each occurrence of the following: self, 
other people, places, psychological and physiological states, events, objects, dates, 
measurements, and amounts. One half point was recorded for modifying adverbs or 
adjectives. 
Hypothesis 2. The criterion variable for Hypothesis 2 was the degree of uniqueness 
ofan excuse. The degree of uniqueness, coded as a continuous measure, was 
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defined as the sum of the specificity and temporal probability measures. A specific 
excuse involved a distinctive event/state caused by a choice or decision by the protagonist, 
e.g., "I picked up my manager's grandmother at the airport" (1 point). A nonspecific 
excuse involved a common event/state, not caused by the protagonist(s)' choice or 
decision, e.g., "The train was late" (0 point). The temporal probability of an excuse was 
defined as the true likelihood of the event's occurrence over time: likely daily occurrence, 
e.g., traffic conditions (1 point); likely weekly occurrence, e.g., forgetting, negligence (2 
points); likely monthly occurrence, e.g., illness (3 points); likely three-monthly 
occurrence, e.g., automobile problems (4 points): likely six-monthly occurrence, e.g., 
problems, situations with relatives (5 points); likely annual occurrence, e.g., vandalism of 
person/property (6 points). 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. The criterion variable for Hypotheses 3 and 4 was defined as 
the frequency of the excuse. It was operationalized by the response to item (a) in the 
questionnaire that the excuse had been used before (coded 1) or a response to item ( e) in 
the questionnaire that the excuse was new (coded 0). 
Predictor 
Hypotheses 1. 2. and 3. The predictor variable for Hypotheses 1,2, and 3 was 
defined as the level of knowledge the recipient has about the excuse giver, and was 
operationalized by the degree of intimacy of recipients to excuse givers (cf. Millar & 
Millar, 1995): work/school = low knowledge level, parent = medium knowledge level, 
spouse/girl!boyfriend = high knowledge level. 
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Hypothesis 4. The predictor variable for Hypothesis 4 was defined as the 
perceived power of deception of the excuse. It was operationalized by the response to 
item (c) of the questionnaire that an excuse was "very unlikely or impossible" to be 
exposed as a lie (coded 1) or a nonresponse to item (c) (coded 0). 
Ancillarv Variables 
Additional variables included a dichotomous "intimacy" variable coded according 
to whether the excuse giver lived with (coded 1) or did not live with (coded 0) the 
recipient, and was determined from descriptions of the situation, the excuse, and the result 
of the excuse; descriptions of two cases were considered to be ambiguous in identifying 
living arrangements and were excluded from analysis. A dichotomous "success" variable 
was coded according to whether the excuse was successful (coded 1) or unsuccessful 
(coded 0), and was determined from the description ofthe excuse result. 
Further, for the circumstance described in the questionnaire, an additional variable 
was coded 0 or 1 by the coder depending on whether the recipient could or could not have 
witnessed the event describing the excuse. This was to provide a convergent validity 
comparison for the predictor variable of Hypothesis 4. 
It was assumed that having participants identify for themselves the perceived 
consequences of the deception would indicate the real reason for the excuse; and asking 
them to imagine and describe possible consequences if they had revealed the truth would 
point to the purpose for the excuse. 
Reliability of Coding 
1.2 
Results 
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The principal experimenter and a graduate student scored questionnaires 
independently. The graduate student judge received training in identifYing content 
categories, and estimating complexity, specificity, and temporal probability scores. Before 
analysis ofthe results, 50 pages were randomly selected from work, spouse, and parent 
questionnaires, respectively, and coded by the trained graduate student coder to test for 
inter-rater reliability. Inter-rater agreement in coding random responses was as follows: 
for coder estimation of detection probability, Cohen's kappa = .658; for content 
identification, Cohen's kappa = .958. Inter-rater intimacy reliability was measured by 
comparision of a college graduate's and the experimenter's independent estimations of 
living status from 75 randomly selected spouse and parent questionnaires (Cohen's kappa 
= .78). 
Missing Data 
A total of309 valid excuses were recorded from the 121 participants; 109 excuses 
in the work/school context, 105 in the parent context, and 96 in the spouselboy/girlfriend 
context. A total of 120 completed self monitoring scores were recorded. Missing and 
I Because of the variable nature of the data, and the fact that some results impact 
on subsequent tests, a full discussion of each test will follow immediately after the result. 
2 All tests have a confidence interval of 95%. 
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responses included: no excuses given in any contexts (eight community respondents 
refused to fill out the context questionnaires after reading the instructions, and one student 
participant claimed she had never lied); no excuses in particular contexts (two student 
participants claimed they never had occasion to make excuses to those recipients, five 
community respondents noted it was too long ago to recall, and one student said she had 
never had a boyfriend). Reasons for invalid responses included: simple denial of 
actionlnonaction; use of a context other than specified; no verbal excuse (described an 
action only); and telling the truth. 
Subject Charateristics: Self Monitoring and Age 
The mean age difference between UNF students (M = 25.3) and community 
participants (M = 54.0) was found significant using the Mann-Whitney test, chosen 
because of normality problems (Z = -7.72, ~ < .001). The difference between mean self 
monitoring scores ofUNF students (M = 7.1) and community participants (M = 9.3) was 
found to be significant (Z = -.2.70, ~ = .007), as was the age difference between high self 
monitors (M = 26.89 years), defined by a score of 10 and above, and low self monitors 
(M = 37.77 years), defined by a score of 9 or below (Z = -3.58, ~ < .001). Results 
indicated that UNF students were significantly younger and had lower self monitoring 
scores than community participants, and that overall, high monitors were significantly 
younger than low monitors. The results of a 2 X 2 ANOV A to test the relationship of 
age X area for self monitoring found a main effect for age only (E = 7.67, df: 1, ~ = .007). 
In addition, self monitoring scores were found to be significantly negatively correlated 
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with age (pearson r = -.355, Q < .001). This result suggests self monitoring scores may 
not be a static marker reflecting two distinct separate types of self monitoring 
personalities, but may be based on the resultant influence of the self monitoring trait and 
other variables, such as age, rather than the self monitoring trait alone. The possibility. 
arises that with age progression, the scores of some people may change to reflect an 
increase in low monitoring behaviors: i.e., with maturity and possibly more confidence in 
their own values, their behavior is less influenced by those around them. On the other 
hand, the self monitoring scores of young people may be more likely to reflect such high 
monitoring behavior concerns as peer acceptance. This speculation would support the 
human development theories identifYing the influence of peer pressure on young adult 
behavior. 
Hypothesis 1. The complexity of an excuse is positively related to the knowledge 
level the recipient has about the excuse giver. A repeated measures ANOV A was used to 
test Hypotheses 1 and 1 a. The three within subject factors were the work, parent, and 
spouse/boy/girlfriend contexts; the between subject factors were sex, self monitoring 
scores (low, 9 or below; high, over 10), and age (under 40, over 40). 
Results ofthe within subjects contrasts (n = 90) showed that'the mean complexity 
of excuses in the parent context (M = 4.11) was significantly greater than complexity of 
excuses in the work/school context, M = 3.35 (E = 12.9, df: 2, Q = .001). However, the 
complexity of excuses in the spouse/boy/girlfriend context (M = 3.71) was not 
significantly different from the complexity of either the work/school context, M = 3.35 
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Fig.l a. Mean complexity levels for excuses in work, parent, and spouse/boy/girlfriend 
contexts. 
(E = 3.43, df: 2, Q = ns) or the parent context, M = 4.11 (I: = 3.87, df: 2, Q = ns) (see 
Fig.la). 
The results suggest that excuses to parents contain more information and are more 
complex than excuses to employers/teachers. Hypothesis I is supported for the low 
knowledge context (work/school) and the high knowledge context (parent). It is not 
supported for the high knowledge context of spouse/boy/girlfriend. 
The rationale for this hypothesis assumed that the spouse/boy/girlfriend context 
would represent the highest knowledge level of the excuse giver, and thus would result in 
a higher mean complexity for the excuse content. A closer look at both relationship 
components shows that the two high level knowledge contexts differ in important, 
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previously unexamined ways. 
First, the relationships serve quite different life purposes, the parent relationship 
being one that is imposed on the excuse giver and is generally concerned with providing 
nurture and guidance for the developmental years, while the spouselboy/girlfriend 
relationship is usually one of choice by the excuse giver and is generally concerned with 
social, emotional, and sexual life needs. Second, it is seen that an unequal power 
relationship exists between the excuse giver and recipient in the parent context (and 
work/school context), but that an egalitarian association is in effect between the excuse 
giver and the spouselboy/girlfriend recipient. It can be seen that those individuals in 
power, such as an employer, teacher, or parent, are in a position to supply or deny 
essential needs, such as financial (or future financial) and physical securities. Thus, there 
appears to be a control variable operating in the parent (and work/school) relationship that 
is absent in the more egalitarian spouselboy/girlfriend relationships, which may not involve 
the basic securities so critically. 
Third, because of the broad interpretation of the spouselboy/girlfriend context by 
many of the participants, the content of the relationships covered multiple, distinct 
associations, which again differed in purpose and intimacy. From the responses to the 
questionnaires, eight relationships were identified within the two high knowledge base 
contexts. The parent context described two situations, that of participants living with their 
parents or living apart from them. The six spouselboy/girlfriend relationships included 
those living separately from the participant, such as boy/girl dating, same sex 
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Fig.1 b. Mean complexity levels for excuses in work, parent 0, parent 1, spouse 0, and 
spouse 1 contexts. 
friends, divorcees; and those living with participants, such as married spouses, boy/girl 
cohabiting couples, and same sex roommates. 
The mean complexities of five context levels, work, parent ° (not living with), 
parent I (living with), spouse/boy/girlfriend ° (not living with), and spouse/boy/girlfriend 
I (living with) were tested following the new interpretation of the context relationships. 
Because of unbalanced data, paired t -tests were used instead of a repeated measures 
ANOY A to compare the work/school (low knowledge context) with the four high level 
knowledge relationship contexts identified as parent 0, parent I , spouse 0, and spouse 1 
(see Fig. I b). 
Results showed that only the complexity of excuses in the high level knowledge 
relationship parent context (parent I) was significantly greater than the complexity of the 
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excuses in the low knowledge level work/school context en = 85, M = .59, ! = 2.69, df: 
84, Q = .002). No significant differences in complexity were found for comparisons ofthe 
work context to the three other high knowledge level contexts, parent 0 en = 14, M = .00, 
! = .00, df: 13, Q = ns), spouse 0 (n = 59, M = -.43, ! = 1.82, df: 58, Q = ns), and spouse 1 
en = 34, M = .161,! = .796, df: 33, Q = ns). Results suggest that only excuses to parents 
who live with participants contain more information than excuses to employers/teachers. 
Thus, it is concluded that Hypothesis 1 is supported for the low knowledge context 
(work/school) and the high knowledge context (living with parents). It is not supported 
for the other high knowledge level relationships. 
Discussion of the five context complexity results identifies the control factor of 
the unequal power relationship as being more important to complexity levels than the 
intimacy factor (participants living with or not living with recipients). Of the eight high 
knowledge level relationship contexts, only the one involving an unequal power 
relationship was significantly different in complexity of excuses from the low knowledge 
level work/school context. 
The evidence supports the speculation that without the control factor present in a 
relationship, the hypothesis of complexity of excuses is not observed. An analogy would 
be of drivers on ~ higqway strictly obeying the speed limit when law enforcement officers, 
who alsO" ~ve the pOW(fr to threaten the drivers' personal financial/physical security, are 
present. However, when the law enforcement personnel are not in evidence, speed laws 
tend to be disregarded. 
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Hypothesis 1 a. The complexity of an excuse is positively related to the self 
monitoring score. Tests of between subjects effects from the same repeated measures 
ANOVA used to test Hypothesis 1 showed that the variables of sex (E = .025, df: 1, Q = 
ns), self monitoring (E = 1.14, df: 1, Q = ns), and age (E = 2.54, df: 1, Q = ns) had no effect 
on levels of complexity in this study. The results support the previous study of Millar and 
Millar (1995), who found no difference in complexity scores for high or low self monitors. 
For this study, it could be suggested that other forces, such as those governing the 
security issues, might exert a more powerful effect and may mask influences due to 
individual difference characteristics of sex, age, and self monitoring. 
Hypothesis 2. The uniqueness of an excuse is Qositively related to the knowledge 
level the reciQient has about the excuse giver. The within subjects contrasts test of a 
repeated measures ANOV A with the three contexts as within subject factors CN = 95) 
showed that the uniqueness of excuses in the high knowledge level parent context (M = 
4.62) is significantly greater than the uniqueness of excuses in the low knowledge level 
work context, M = 4.03 (E = 8.05, df: 1, Q = .006) and the high knowledge level spouse/ 
boy/girlfriend context, M = 4.06 (E = 9.47, df= 1, Q = .003) (see Fig.2a). The high 
knowledge level spouselboy/girlfriend mean value did not differ significantly from the low 
knowledge level work/school context. The results suggest that excuses in the latter 
contexts would describe common, more frequently occurring situations, whereas excuses 
to parents are more likely to describe unusual, less frequently occurring situations. 
Thus Hypothesis 2 is supported for low (work) and high (parent) knowledge 
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Fig.2a. Mean uniqueness levels for work, parent, and spouse/boy/girlfriend contexts. 
levels. It is not supported for (high) spouse/boy/girlfriend relationships. 
The results reflect a similar situation as in Hypothesis 1. The spouse/boy/girlfriend 
context again includes the multiple egalitarian relationship factors, the combination of 
influences of which may neutralized the uniqueness effects or fail to activate them. A 
comparison of the uniqueness levels of the work context to the four high knowledge level 
contexts identified by intimacy levels as in Hypothesis 1 was made using paired t-tests 
(see Fig.2b). 
Results comparing the five contexts showed that uniqueness of excuses in the 
living with parent context, parent I , is significantly greater than uniqueness in the work 
context (n = 86, M = .57, ! = 3.17, df: 85 , 12 = .002). No significant differences in 
uniqueness of excuses were found comparing the work context to parent 0 (n = 14, 
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Fig.2b. Mean uniqueness levels for work, parent 0, parent 1, spouse 0, and spouse 1 
contexts. 
M = -.003, 1 = .05 , df: 13, Q = ns), spouse 0 (n = 59, M = .15, 1 = .85, df: 58, Q = ns), or 
spouse 1 (n = 34, M = -.36, 1 = 1.31 , df: 33 , Q = 115). The results of the five context 
comparisons of mean uniqueness suggest that excuses to parents are more likely to 
describe unusual, less frequent ly occurring situations, but only if participants are living 
with them. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported for the low knowledge context (work/school) 
and the high knowledge context (living with parents) . It is not supported for the other 
high knowledge level relationships. 
The evidence again shows the parent-living-with context, the only high knowledge 
level context that includes an unequal power relationship, is the only high knowledge 
context that supports the hypothesis. Parallel to the first hypothesis' results, Hypothesis 
2 is supported only in the context sitl\ations that appear to include a control variable. 
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The intimacy variable is not seen as influential as the control variable, because, 
again, the means of the intimate and nonintimate spouselboy/girlfriend contexts, spouse 1 
and spouse 0, do not differ significantly from the work context. It is noted from the results 
of both Hypotheses 1 and 2 that the highest knowledge context appears to be parent 1 
(living with). This is not consistent with the original definition of the high knowledge level 
contexts in the method section. There, the parent context was assumed 
to represent a moderate knowledge level of the recipient, with spouse/boy/girlfriend 
representing the highest knowledge level context. The results of the tests of Hypotheses 
1 and 2 suggest that there may be two types of knowledge base, short term (intimate 
day to day knowledge) and long term intimacy (knowledge of a person over time). 
Parent 1 includes both types of knowledge (possibly the highest knowledge base), while 
parent 0 would more likely be restricted to temporal knowledge (possibly the lowest 
knowledge base, from the point of view of excuse makers). The relationships included in 
the spouse 1 and spouse 0 contexts would appear to combine varying degrees of both 
knowledge types. 
Hypothesis 3. The frequency of an excuse is negatively related to the knowledge 
level the recipient has of the excuse giver. A chi square test of proportion was used to 
compare new and old excuse frequencies within the work (low knowledge level), and 
parent and spouselboy/girlfriend (high knowledge level) contexts (see Fig.3). Results 
showed that a significantly larger proportion of excuses were used before in the work (chi 
square = 7.51, df: 1, p = .006), parent (chi square = 19.04, df: 1, ~ <.001), and 
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Fig.3. Frequencies of old and new excuses within the work, parent, and 
spouse/boy/girlfriend contexts. 
spouse/boy/girlfriend (chi square = 14.45, df: 1, p <. 001) contexts. The evidence does 
not support Hypothesis 3; no relationship was found between frequency and knowledge 
level. Participants used old excuses more frequently than new excuses in all contexts. 
The results support the findings of Hample (1980) that most excuses were 
repeated. However, the percentages for this study, 64%, 65%, and 65% for work, parent, 
and spouse/boy/girlfriend contexts, respectively, are lower than Hample' s reported 75%. 
It is possible that the long term (temporal) intimacy variable may be operating for the high 
knowledge level contexts. Because of the length of intimacy over time in many of the high 
level knowledge contexts, there may only be a limited amount of new scenarios available, 
in which case, old successful excuses would tend to be repeated. 
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Hypothesis 4. The frequency of an excuse is negatively related to perceived 
deception. The result of the convergent validity test for perceived deception showed 
significant differences between the rater and participant agreement for perceived deception 
(Fisher's exact test, p < .001). The Cohen kappa agreement measurement (.119) gives 
further evidence of negligible agreement. This result shows that ev.en with no possibility 
of recipients witnessing the excuse situation, participants were less confident of the 
success of the excuse than the rater. This result may be seen to not only emphasize the 
difference between laboratory (objective) and real life (subjective) responses for this study, 
but might, in addition, provide more evidence for the importance of external validity for 
experimental results. 
For the ''not identified" condition of perceived deception (see FigAa) in which the 
participant did not respond to item (a) of the questionnaire, the resulting test of proportion 
for each context's new and old excuses were as follows: work (chi square = 6.0, df: 1, p 
= .014), parent (chi square = 9.0, df: 1, p = .003), and spouselboy/girlfriend (chi square = 
10.7, df: 1, p = .001). The results showed that when success probability was not identified 
(28% of excuses in this study), old excuses were used significantly more than new 
excuses in all contexts. This indicates that in low/neutral confidence conditions, such as 
the ''not identified" condition here, there appears to be more reliance on old excuses than 
new. Lessening of confidence appears to decrease the risk taking of new excuses. In 
other words, the results support the idea that people tend to rely on old behavior in 
uncertain conditions. 
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Other Analyses 
The relationship of complexity and content categories. The question answered 
here was: Do excuses within individual content categories vary in mean complexity? The 
mean complexity of each of the six content categories of excuses identified from the 
questionnaire excuse statements together with the frequency of each category within the 
three contexts is shown in Table 1. The category means were compared using a repeated 
measures ANOVA with the three knowledge levels and the six category levels for Factor I 
and Factor 2, respectively, of the within subject factor. Results ofthe within subject factor 
contrasts showed that the mean complexity level of the relative/friend/other category (M. = 
4.29) was significantly greater than the mean complexity levels for illness, M = 2.54 (;t = 
15.26, df: 1, p < .001), other commitment, M = 3.12 (;t = 8.73, df: 1, p = .004), 
transportation, M = 2.97 (;t = 31.18, df: 1, p < .001), and forget/negligence, M = 3.05 
(;t = 15.28, df: 1, p < .001). Similarly, the mean complexity of the miscellaneous 
category (M = 4.14) was significantly greater than the mean complexity levels of 
categories for illness (E = 35.68, df: 1, p < .001), other commitment (;t = 29.70, df: 1, p > 
.001), transportation (E = 73.73, df: 1, p < .001), and forget/negligence (;t = 40.83, df: 1, 
p < .001). Thus, the results show that the relative/friend/other and miscellaneous 
categories were both significantly greater in complexity than all other categories, but were 
not significantly different in complexity from each other (E = 2.8, df: 1, p = ns); they were 
both identified as "complex" in nature. All other categories were identified as "simple" in 
nature (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Frequencies of Excuse Categories within Work/School Parent/Guardian. and 
SpouselBoylGirlfriend Contexts 
Content Complexity Excuse Frequency 
Category (mean) Nature Work Parent Spouse 
Relative/friend 4.29 Complex 19 30 21 
Illness(a) 2.54 Simple 42* 2 8 
Other commitment(b) 3.12 Simple 12 14 26* 
Transportation(c) 2.97 Simple 13* 3 3 
Forget/negligence 3.05 Simple 9 6 7 
Miscellaneous(d) 4.l4 Complex 13 50* 31 
Total 108 105 96 
* Denotes context with significantly greater excuse frequency within that content 
category: (a) R < .001; (b) R = .024; (c) R = .004; (d) R < .001. 
Total 
70 
52 
52 
19 
22 
94 
309 
The relationshiR of frequency of excuse categories and the knowledge level the 
reciRient has of the excuse giver. The question answered here was: Does the frequency of 
excuse categories vary according to the context? Table 1 shows the distribution of 
excuses within each content category for three contexts. The Cochrane test for 
dichotomous related variables was used to compare excuse frequencies of each category 
within the low knowledge level (work) and high knowledge level (parent and 
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spouselboy/girlfriend) contexts. Significant differences were found within the illness 
(Cochrane's Q = 58.17, df: 2, R < .001), other commitment (Cochrane's Q = 7.47, df: 2, R 
= .024), transportation (Cochrane's Q = 11.11, df: 2, R = .004), and miscellaneous 
(Cochrane's Q = 28.14, df: 2, R < .001) categories. 
As the relative/friend/other and miscellaneous categories had been identified as 
complex in nature, more excuses will be expected within the high knowledge level 
contexts in support of Hypothesis 1. From Table 1, it is seen that although the parent 
context has the greatest frequency of excuses in the relative/friend/other category, the 
difference within the three contexts is not significant (Cochrane's Q = 4.04, df: 2, R = ns). 
However, this category of excuse assumes a significant position in each of the three 
recipient contexts, being the second most frequently used excuse in the work (17%) and 
parent (28%) contexts, and third most frequently used excuse in the spouselboy/girlfriend 
context (21 %). 
In discussing these results, it is suggested that, although the most influential factor 
for this trend might be that excuses involving relative/friends/others would be difficult to 
challenge within any context, to be accepted in the work/school context, the excuse 
situation would need to describe scenarios which clearly take precedence over immediate 
school or work responsibilities. Examination of the written excuse statements in the 
relative/friends/others category for the work/school context showed that of the excuses 
that appeared to meet this requirement, 53% involved emergency or terminal health 
situations to close relatives (three infant daughters, two sisters, one mother, one 
Deception in Interpersonal Settings 41 
grandmother, and one wife). The exclusive use of one gender in such excuses is note 
worthy, and suggests that the excuse makers felt recipients would be more accepting of 
situations featuring emergencies to females. 
The results of the frequency contrasts of the miscellaneous category support 
Hypothesis 1 (Cochrane's Q = 28.14, df: 2,12 < .001). Significantly more excuses were 
recorded for both high knowledge level contexts of parent (53% oftotal excuses in the 
miscellaneous category) and spouselboy/girlfriend (32%) compared to the low knowledge 
level work context (14%). The miscellaneous category accounted for the highest 
frequency of excuses within the parent (48%) and spouse (32%) contexts. A practical 
explanation suggests that although miscellaneous excuses might be difficult to detect as 
untrue in any context, they may also be less likely to be acceptable within the work/school 
context for similar reasons to those in the relative/friend/other category. For example, one 
miscellaneous excuse to a spouse for not arriving home on time was that the participant 
''fell asleep in the car" after a drinking spree. Although accepted by his wife, it is unlikely 
that this same excuse would be accepted by his employer for not arriving to work on time. 
The illness, other commitment, transportation, and forget/negligence categories 
have been identified as simple in nature, and more excuses would be expected within the 
low knowledge level context in support of Hypothesis 1. Results of frequency 
contrasts in the illness category supported the hypothesis (Cochrane's Q = 58.17, df: 2, 
IL < .001). Illness was used significantly more as an excuse when the recipients were 
employers or teachers (80% of excuses in this category) and significantly less for either 
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parents (4%) or spouse/girVboyfriends (15%). In this case, it is not difficult to see that 
the excuse simply would not "work" as well in the closer relationship area because parents 
and significant others who live with the excuse maker would be more likely to know 
his/her true state of health at any time, and any lie would be easily detected. 
Results of the other commitment/work/study content category contrasts did not 
support Hypothesis 1 (Cochrane's Q = 7.47, df: 2, n = .024). In fact, significantly more 
excuses (50% in this category) were recorded for the high knowledge level spouse 
context, with 23% and 27% of excuses recorded for the work/school and parent contexts, 
respectively. It is note worthy that an excuse involving an other commitment/work/study 
was regarded by excuse makers as a significantly more desirable excuse for the egalitarian 
relationship context (spouselboy/girlfriend), and significantly less desirable for the 
unequal power relationships of work/school and parent contexts. In effect, the result 
suggests that excuse makers would be more concerned with offending those in power 
(which might possibly involve a threat to their essential securities) by inferring that other 
commitments might take precedence over those of the recipients. In contrast, other 
commitment/work/study excuses to the egalitarian spouselboy/girl relationships would be 
more likely to succeed, particularly when the excuse involved other commitments 
to work or school, which would be considered an acceptable priority over most 
spouselboy/girlfriend issues. 
The frequency of excuses in the transportation category supported Hypothesis 1 
(Cochrane's Q = 11.11, df: 2, n = .004). The transportation category was used 
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significantly more when the recipient was an employer or teacher (68% of category), than 
either a parent (16%) or a spouselboy/girlfriend (16%). As a practical explanation for 
these results, it can be seen that the chances of a spouse, significant other, or parent living 
with the participant discovering the truth (and uncovering the lie) would be relatively high, 
as they would already be in an informed position regarding any likely transportation 
situations of the excuse maker. In the case ofworklschool associates (or parents who do 
not live with the recipient), intimate details of the excuse giver are not usually available, 
and the transportation excuse could be given with more confidence. 
Resuhs of frequency distribution in the forget/negligence category did not support 
Hypothesis 1 (Cochrane's Q = .70, df: 2, 12 = ns). This category was the least used ofall 
the six categories (7% ofthe overall total excuses), comprising 8%, 6%, and 7% ofthe 
total excuses recorded for the work, parent, and spouselboy/girlfriend contexts, 
respectively. A subjective explanation for this result suggests that although the excuse 
may be "successful" in sense that it would be believed, it may not be accepted: the 
consequences ofthe excuse may be just as damaging as the consequences of the truth (i.e., 
in both cases the relationship might be threatened, possibly precipitating undesirable 
consequences). Thus, excuse makers appear to consider admitting to forgetfulness or 
negligence in any context area to be of limited success value (accounting for less than 10% 
of excuses in any context). A possible theoretical explanation of the low response may lie 
within the attribution theory. The excuses in this category do not appear to meet the 
requirements of the attribution theory, in that they describe situations that are internal and 
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controllable to the excuse maker. This result would support the feeling of Weiner and his 
collaborators that excuse situations need to decrease inferences of personal responsibility, 
i.e., to reflect external and uncontrollable scenarios, in order to meet excuse goal 
requirements. This same problem of attnbution may apply to the other commitment/work 
category results, where again, there were no significant frequency differences between the 
low knowledge level (work) and high knowledge level (parent) contexts. 
Thus, one theoretical explanation for the pattern of the results shown in Table 1 is 
that a necessary condition for demonstration of the complexity hypotheses is that excuses 
might first need to meet the attnbution requirements of being external and uncontrollable. 
Subjectively, however, excuse categories appear to be chosen for two reasons (a) how 
likely they are to remain undetected, and (b) whether that particular type of excuse would 
be accepted by the recipient. In effect, the frequency pattern seems to suggest that 
excuses in a particular content category were regarded by excuse givers as a clearly 
desirable or undesirable choice for that recipient. 
The relationship of the nature of excuses and the knowledge level the recipient has 
about-the-excuse giver. The question t-o be answered here was: Do the nature of excuses, 
whether they are cotnp1ex or simple, vary with the context? Results of chi square tests of 
proportions for fr-equencies of simple and complex excuses within the work context, 
representing "low knowledge "level of the recipient, and parent and spouse/boy/girlfriend 
contexts, representing the high knowledge level of the recipient, are shown in Table 2. 
For the low level knowledge level context (work), simple excuses were used 
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Table 2 
Comparison of Simple and Complex Excuse Freguencies within Three· Contexts 
Context 
Work 
Parent 
Spouse 
Total 
Excuse Freguencies 
Simple Complex 
76 
25 
43 
144 
32 <R < .001) 
80 Ul < .001) 
53 <R = .414) 
165 
significantly more than complex excuses (chi square = 17.92, df: 1, P < .001). For the 
high knowledge level context (parent), complex excuses were used significantly more 
than simple excuses (chi square = 28.81, df: 1, p = < .001). There was no significant 
difference in the use of simple or complex excuses in the high knowledge level 
spouselboy/girlfriend context (chi square = .66, df: 1, p = ns). Thus, excuses to employers 
or teachers are more likely to be simple in nature, excuses to parents are more likely to be 
complex in nature, but excuses to other relationships are as likely to be simple as complex. 
The results of the work and parent contexts support the complexity hypothesis in that 
excuses more complex in nature would be more likely to be used in the high knowledge 
contexts, and those more simple in nature would be more likely to be used in the low 
knowledge level context. The results of the spouselboy/girlfriend context do not support 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Simple and Complex Excuse Frequencies within Five Contexts 
Context Excuse Frequency 
Simple Complex 
Work 76 32 (p < .001) 
Parent 0 8 13 (p = .275) 
Parent 1 17 67 m < .001) 
Spouse 0 22 37 (p = .423) 
Spouse 1 21 16 (p = .752) 
Total 144 165 
the complexity hypothesis. 
Further investigation reveals the same situation as seen in the complexity and 
uniqueness hypotheses. The spouse context again includes egalitarian multiple 
relationship factors which may similarly neutralize the effects of complexity issues and 
thus the tendency to use either simple or complex natured excuses. Table 3 shows results 
of chi square tests of proportion for five contexts including the intimacy levels previously 
identified as work, parent 1, parent 0, spouse 1, and spouse O. 
Parent 1 (living with participant) was again the only high knowledge level context 
to indicate significantly higher use of complex excuses (chi square = 29.76, df: 1, P < 
.001). No significance was found for tests for parent 0 (chi square = 1.19, df: 1, p = ns), 
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spouse 0 (chi square = .64, df: 1, :Q = ns), and spouse 1 (chi square = .10, df: 1,:Q = ns). 
Thus, excuses to employers and teachers are more likely to be simple in nature, excuses to 
parents are more likely to be complex only when participants live with them, and excuses 
to recipients in all other relationships are as equally likely to be simple as complex. 
It is noted that parent 1 is, again, the only high knowledge level context that 
represents an unequal power relationship. The intimacy factor was not considered as 
influential, because neither spouse I nor spouse 0 relationships differed with regard to 
proportion of simple or complex excuse use. The evidence again supports the speculation 
that without the control factor present in a relationship, excuse givers use both simple and 
complex excuses to the same degree. 
The relationshi:Q of success of an excuse to the knowledge level the reci:Qient 
has about the excuse maker. The question posed for this examination ofthe data was, 
"Do excuses vary in success rates within the work, parent, spouselboy/girlfriend 
contexts?" A comparison of successful and unsuccessful excuses for the three contexts 
was carried out using the McNemar test for nonparametric related dichotomous data. 
Results showed that excuses in the work/school context are significantly more successful 
than excuses in the parent (:Q = .001) or spouselboy/girlfriend context (:Q = .021). There 
was no significant difference between success rates comparing the parent and 
spouselboy/girlfriend contexts (:Q = ns). More excuses failed to parents (13%) than 
to spouselboyfriends/girlfriends (11 %) or employers/teachers (2%). Thus, excuses 
to employers/teachers appear to be more successful than excuses to parents or to 
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spouselboy/girlfriends. Excuses appeared to be equally as successful to parents as to 
spouselboy/girlfriends. The results also suggest that there may be a negative relationship 
between success of an excuse and knowledge level of the recipient, in that excuses in low 
knowledge level (work or school) contexts appear to be more successful than excuses in 
the high level knowledge (parent or spouselboy/girlfriend) contexts. 
An explanation for these results may lie in the fact that because the work contex 
is the lowest knowledge base, and possibly of the least temporal duration, recipients are 
less likely to know the true situation of the excuse giver. In addition, more effort and 
thought may go into excuse preparation, because serious consequences might result in 
their failure within this context (termination of relationship, getting fired from the job, 
loss or failure of grade in schoo1, etc.). On the other hand, failure of excuses in the 
parent or spouselboy/girlfriend relationship may be less likely to result in such 
irrevocable situations, even though negative consequences could result; a "forgiveness" 
principle might be operating in these cases, particularly if the relationship is a good one, 
otherwise. 
The relationship of success of an excuse and frequency of use. The question posed 
for this analysis was: "Are previously used excuses more successful than new excuses?" A 
chi square test of proportion for new and old successful excuses was carried out for each 
of the three contexts of work, parent, and spouselboy/girlfriend. The results showed that 
previously used excuses were significantly more successful than new excuses in the 
work (chi square = 8.9, df: 1, P = .003), parent (chi square = 20.28, df: 1, p < .001), and 
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spouse/boy/girlfriend (chi square = 12.93, df: 1, Q < .001) contexts. Thus, previously used 
excuses tend to be more successful and used more often regardless of the recipient. 
The result of this analysis may reflect the pragmatic reason for the choice of 
specific excuses, following the operant conditioning principle of behavioral science, that 
rewarded behavior will be repeated. The two excuses that failed in the work/school 
context had a complexity mean of7.0, compared to the complexity mean of successful 
excuses in this context of 3.3 7. This supports the complexity hypotheses in that excuses in 
the work/school context (low knowledge level) need to contain a minimum of information 
to be successful. However, subjectively, the excuse makers would have only been aware 
that the excuses in these instances had failed. That the complexity hypotheses may also be 
in effect would be of little concern to them. In other words, subjective trial and error, i.e.~ 
whether specific excuses were successful or not would determine their future use, rather 
than objective reasoning based on theoretical complexity issues. 
Conclusion 
This study has investigated the nature of excuses, including estimations of excuse 
complexity, uniqueness, frequency, and success. Particular emphasis has been given to the 
changes in such characteristics within different contexts distinguished by the level of 
knowledge the recipient has about the excuse giver. 
Evidence has been found that the complexity and uniqueness of excuses vary 
positively with the knowledge level of the recipient when an unequal power relationship 
exists between the recipient and the excuse giver. Data analysis showed that excuses to 
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recipients with a low personal knowledge level of the excuse giver, such as employers or 
teachers, tended to be simple in nature, contain a minimum amount of information, and 
were usually common and frequently occurring. In contrast, excuses to recipients with a 
high personal knowledge of the excuse giver, such as parents who lived with the 
participants, tended to be complex in nature, contained significantly larger amounts of 
information, were generally more specific to the excuse giver and less frequently 
occurring. The present study supports Lippard's (1988) conclusions that relationship 
variables are key factors in deceptive communication. 
Hample (1980) identified the unequal power relation of excuse makers to parent 
or achievement contexts from the point of view that the recipients in these categories were 
the individuals deceived most frequently. Lippard also identified power as an important 
variable for excuse making with the goal of moderating or mitigating the control of those 
in power. Her findings are reflected in this study where the purpose of most of the excuses 
to employers or teachers appeared to be directed to avoiding work or school related 
responsibilities, such as not going to work or delaying school assignments or tests, and the 
purpose of many excuses to parents involved clandestine encounters with 
non-parent-approved friends of the opposite sex. Lippard also recognized the parent 
context as exerting the most control over the lives of excuse givers. In the present study, 
parents living with participants were identified as probably having the highest personal 
knowledge level of excuse givers, with information based on both immediate day to day 
and long term (temporal) intimacy. 
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No relationship was found for complexity and uniqueness of excuses for egalitarian 
relationships between recipient and excuse giver, despite that fact that all relationships 
identified in the work ofMcCornack and Parks (1986) and Millar and Millar (1995), 
which fonned much of the theoretical basis of the present study, were egalitarian and none 
of an unequal power structure. The difference in the responses in the present study may be 
a reflection of the obvious contrast in methodology and focus. In the Millar and Millar 
experiment, the responses for recipients' detection of untrue objective statements in two 
personal relationships, friends and strangers, were compared in an experimental setting. In 
contrast, the present correlational study measures excuse givers' responses for real life 
deception issues within two professional and eight personal relationships (which did not 
include strangers). 
Frequency analysis showed that old excuses were used more than new excuses in 
all contexts, which supported the findings of Hample (1980) that most excuses had been 
used before. Previously used excuses were also found to be more frequent in low or 
neutral confidence conditions, and were more likely to be successful. In addition, excuses 
were more successful to employers or teachers than to parents or spouselboy/girlfriends. 
Examination of the mean complexity of excuses in individual content categories 
identified two categories as "complex" in nature, and four as "simple" in nature. In 
support of the main complexity hypothesis, excuses to employers or teachers were more 
likely to be from categories identified as simple in nature, excuses to parents were more 
likely to be from categories identified as complex in nature. However, excuses to 
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spouselboy/girlfriends were as likely to be simple as complex in nature. The absence of 
the unequal power relationship for this context is again suggested as a reason for this 
anomaly. 
Complexity analysis for the six content categories showed different categories of 
excuses emerging for different recipients of the excuses. Illness accounted for the greatest 
number of excuses for employers or teachers (39% of all excuses to employers or 
teachers), whereas the miscellaneous category was used most for parents and 
spouselboy/girlfriends (48% and 32% ofall excuses in the respective contexts). The 
majority use of the simple category (illness) for the low knowledge level context of 
work/school and the majority use for the complex category (miscellaneous) for the high 
knowledge contexts of parent and spouselboy/girlfriend also supports the main complexity 
hypotheses of this study. 
Tests of between subject effects of the repeated measures ANOVA which 
compared complexity within the three contexts, showed that the variables of sex, self 
monitoring, and age had no effect on the levels of complexity for this study. However, in 
a separate analysis, a strong negative relationship was found for self monitoring with age. 
The results of this study support those of the Millar and Millar experiment, which reported 
no effects of self monitoring on information levels of excuses. 
Strengths of the Study 
The approach of this study has weighed the theories of more than one 
psychological discipline in explaining the nature of excuses, and has thereby possibly 
Deception in Interpersonal Settings 53 
increased their power of prediction by recogillzing the contribution of research from more 
than one source. Results from cognitive psychology experiments on detection 
investigating information levels of excuses have been applied to findings of correlational 
studies on content and context of excuse deception in social psychology settings; the 
motivation/drive theories of developmental psychology have been proposed to explain 
differences in responses in egalitarian and unequal power relationships; finally the 
behavioral science theory of operant conditioning has been suggested for participants' 
pragmatic reasons for choice of excuses. 
The study has the external validity advantages of a correlational study in a field 
setting with the influence of real life factors, together with experimental dimensions 
provided by manipUlation of recipient conditions and selection of different types of 
participants. The importance of external validity has been demonstrated by significant 
differences in responses to perceived deception judgments by coders and participants, and 
by the recognition of the influence of the unequal power relationship on the content of 
excuses in real life settings not previously recognized in laboratory experiments on 
information levels. Discussion of results has acknowledged that responses in real life 
appear to be the resultant of more than one force or influence. The present design and 
procedures adapted from previous correlation studies (Lippard, 1988; Weiner et al. 1991) 
have thus resolved some of the problems formerly identified by reviewers concerning 
deception experiments. They included such strategies as using personal rather than 
impersonal relationships, a focus on the recipient as well as on the excuse giver, and 
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interactive roles in an experimental setting for deceivers and recipients who are known to 
each other and are concerned with the results of the deception behavior. In this way, the 
design has considered the dynamic relationship between participants and enabled the 
complexity and motivation of excuses to be examined and measured. The results have 
particularly emphasized the singular effect of the control factor in human interaction, the 
influence of which may be important in other areas of social psychology. 
Limitations of the Study 
The correlational design limits the study's usefulness in that it is unlikely that all 
factors that could have an influence on the complexity and nature of excuses have been 
identified. Additional variables might emerge from a replication study using a design 
suitable for a more powerful analysis, such as multiple regression techniques. This could 
be accomplished with a larger subject base and broader demographic information to 
include as many additional influences that could affect the nature of excuse, including 
quantified degrees of short and long term intimacy, time length of relationship, degree of 
quality of the relationship, exact age ofparticipantlrecipient at the time of the excuse, 
social and economic background details, etc., as examples. The importance of intimacy 
influences were detected in the present study, but were only able to be estimated 
subjectively from participants' descriptive statements. In addition, all dependent measures 
and most independent measures were developed for this study, so that internal validity and 
consistency cannot be assumed. Standardization of measures with replication could 
address this problem. Finally, participants' descriptions of excuses were based on 
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memories of events, which may have been altered over time, repressed, or forgotten 
entirely. Against this fact is that many of the events were emotionally charged, actively 
involved the participants, so most may have been recalled with acceptable accuracy. 
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Appendix A 
University of North Florida Student Informed Consent Form 
Principal Investigator 
Project Title: 
Vera Trefry 
Department of Psychology 
 
Social Communiction Strategies: 
Considerations of Content and Context 
Description of Study: You are asked to complete four questionnaires and one 
demographics form. Three pages of the questionnaires relate to past experiences when 
you are asked to recall giving excuses on occasions concerning your (1) spouse, girlfriend, 
or boyfriend, (2) work or school, and (3) parents or guardians. Questionnaires are 
identified by numbered code only, and all responses are anonymous. Time will be 
provided for answering any questions you may have concerning the questionnaires after 
you have read instructions. Agreement to participate in this study will earn you extra 
credit as stipulated by your course instructor. However, you are free to withdraw your 
consent and discontinue the completion of the questionnaires at any time without incurring 
penalty. The questionnaires should take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
I have read and I understand the procedures described above. I agree to participate in the 
study and I have received a copy of this informed consent. 
Participant Date Witness Date 
Principal Investigator Date 
Principal Investigator 
Project Title: 
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AppendixB 
Community Informed Consent Form 
Vera Trefry 
Department of Psychology 
 
Social Communication Strategies: 
Considerations of Content and Context 
Description of Study: You are asked to complete four questionnaires and one 
demographics form. Three pages of the questionnaires relate to past experiences when 
you are asked to recall giving excuses on occasions concerning your (1) spouse, girlfriend, 
or boyfriend, (2) work or schoo~ and (3) parents or guardians. Questionnaires are 
identified by numbered code only, and all responses are anonymous. The questionnaires 
should take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
Please return the completed material in the stamped address envelope provided. 
Your willingness to participate in this important study is warmly appreciated. 
Principal Investigator Date 
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Code 0000 
Appendix C 
Demographic Data 
Please provide the following information: 
SEX Male __ _ Female ---
AGE 
STUDENT STATUS full time part time __ _ 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS full time part time __ _ 
full time homemaker ---
none ---
retired ---
Deception in Interpersonal Settings 59 
AppendixD 
Self Monitoring Questionnaire (Snyder, 1974) 
Survey instrument deleted, paper copy available upon request.
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